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What Makes an Oppressor? A Response to Ann Cudd’s Analyzing Oppression
Mari Visscher

Introduction
Ann Cudd’s Analyzing Oppression ends on the question of resistance, where she details
how each social group identified within oppressive systems should take up the project of creating
a more just social structure. To do this, Cudd distinguishes between the oppressed, the merely
privileged, and the oppressors, each with their own unique responsibilities for dismantling
oppression. I find Cudd’s definition of ‘oppressors’ to be too narrowly tailored, and am arguing
that seeking to increase or maintain one’s privilege relative to another group is sufficient to
qualify an individual as an ‘oppressor’. Additionally, I will be expanding Cudd’s analysis of
deformed desires to include the desires of the privileged in order to demonstrate the ways in
which members of privileged groups act to improve or sustain their privileged position. These
desires are deformed by a person’s privileged state and operate to maintain systems of
oppression. It is these systems of oppression which mold a society that recognizes the culture of
the privileged group as the dominant culture. It is for this reason that privileged individuals see
their desires as naturally occurring, inherently good, and universally desired. I will argue that
given that these desires are a direct result of a culture founded on false presumptions that some
social groups are superior to others, these desires are neither natural nor universal, and would not
be desirable in an egalitarian society. I will be applying these desires to all individuals who
belong to privileged groups and will argue that this expansion of Cudd’s deformed desires can
help us further distinguish between those who are merely privileged and who are oppressors. By
applying this expansion to Cudd’s argument we will have gained an improved and more intimate
examination into the experiences and motives of privileged individuals.
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Exposition
Privilege is an essential component to understanding Cudd’s account of oppression. The
existence of a privileged social group that benefits from the institutional harms done to a
corresponding oppressed social group is one of the four jointly necessary and sufficient
conditions for identifying instances of harm as oppression (Cudd, 2006, 25). The remaining three
conditions for assessing oppression require that there is a harm done to the oppressed group
through unjust institutional practices, that the group harmed exists as a social group apart from
the harm, and that there is “unjustified coercion or force that brings about the harm” (25). It is
the privileged social group who are identified by Cudd as the benefactors and perpetrators of the
institutional practices that cause harm to the oppressed group (26). The privileged group achieves
and maintains dominance by implementing social constraints on the oppressed group by means
of direct and indirect material and psychological forces (41). Direct psychological forces include
those which are culturally diffused, such as tradition and convention, religion, ideology, and
cultural domination (167). In a society that has been molded by a dominant social group’s will to
subordinate other social groups, all social institutions within that society will become deeply
entrenched within this systems of oppression. The mainstream traditions, conventions, religions,
and ideologies will all serve to privilege the dominant group and subordinate the oppressed
group. It’s within this environment of direct and culturally diffused psychological forces that
both the oppressor and the oppressed will learn to recognize themselves as their prescribed role
schemas stereotypes. Under this context of social domination, the oppressed group becomes
vulnerable to indirect forces of psychological oppression, which include feelings of shame or low
self-esteem, the cognitive function of false consciousness, and the development of deformed
desires (176). Cudd describes false consciousness as objectionable beliefs formed under the
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conditions of oppression. These false beliefs, held by members of privileged groups and
oppressed groups, suggest that their respective dominant or subordinate social positions are
justified (178). Under systems of oppression, the context of the privileged group’s social
domination becomes the unquestioned reality of privileged groups, who are often unaware of
their privilege and may not knowingly act with the intention of further disadvantaging oppressed
groups (156). Thereby, false consciousness refers to the collective beliefs that the status quo
reflects the true nature of social relations. When oppressed individuals are unaware of their
disadvantaged state, they believe the social and economic inequalities they experience are
deserved, and they may begin to form what Cudd calls deformed desires (180). The term
deformed desires describes the preferences for social and material limitations held by the
oppressed, though the limitations are defined not by the individual’s true desire, but by the
circumstances of oppression (180). These limitations are not consciously or deliberately
developed by the desirer, but instead are oppressive mechanisms resulting from the desirer’s
oppressed state. By holding or acting on these desires, Cudd identifies that members of the
oppressed group are acting in ways which reinforce their own oppressing conditions (152).
Given the social and material limitations placed on them, the oppressed may be unaware that
these desires are due to group-based inequalities. Whether they are aware of their oppressed state
or not, they may either find these limitations to be too great to change and so chose to succumb
to them, or they may come to form co-opted preferences for their restricted conditions of living
(153). These preferences are formed on the basis of the oppressed individual’s rational
assessment of the circumstances surrounding their lives. Choosing to resist the given conditions
of their lives under oppression often requires the oppressed to forfeit situations which benefit
their immediate interests, including security and a comfortable position within the status quo
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(154). Cudd terms a similar corresponding preference formation which she calls the ‘habituation
of preference’, which describes a sense of contentment for the subject’s own “lot in life” (181).
This can apply to both the privileged and the oppressed, who are both capable of becoming
accustomed to their given life circumstances, and may become very uncomfortable with any
change to their social position, even when the change favors a system of more fairly distributed
resources among all people. This is to say that those who are oppressed may feel that their
circumstances are comfortable and warranted, and similarly so for those holding privileged
positions. The oppressed become convinced that their inferiority is natural, just as the privileged
become certain of their natural superiority.
In order for someone to be considered an oppressor under Cudd’s analysis, they “need to
be a member of a privileged group, to gain from the oppression of another social group, to intend
to so gain, and to act to realize that intention by contributing to the oppression of the oppressed
group from whose oppression one gains” (25). Cudd later returns to this analysis to distinguish
between the oppressors and those who she calls ‘the merely privileged’, where she additionally
requires that oppressors “must be aware that he or she is acting unjustly and harming someone
thereby” (195). Someone who is merely privileged simply gains materially or psychologically
from oppression. These merely privileged need not seek out or desire these privileges. They are
in fact unavoidable according to Cudd, and the privileged may not even be aware of them. The
only necessary factor that determines whether an individual is merely privileged is whether or
not they belong to a social group that benefits from the oppression of another social group. Based
on whether an individual is oppressed, merely privileged, or an outright oppressor Cudd
prescribes varying instructions for resistance strategies. The responsibilities of the oppressed do
not have direct consequences for the arguments of this paper and will not be deliberated here.
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The responsibilities of the privileged non-oppressor require them to renounce their undeserved
privileges, and to attempt to change the oppressive social institutions that produced them (196).
Cudd’s analysis requires oppressors to desist their oppressive behaviors and remedy past harm
they have caused.
Critical Analysis
I take issue with Cudd’s qualifications for identifying someone as an oppressor, which
requires that the individual intends to act in a way that is unjust and is also aware of the
consequent harm those actions cause the oppressed group. Cudd establishes preliminary
qualifications for oppressors, which require that the oppressor intends to gain from the
oppression of another social group and acts to realize that intention in a way that actively
contributes to the oppression of the oppressed group (25). This means that it is not enough to say
that someone actively engaging in behaviors that systematically harm other groups is an
oppressor. They must also be aware that they are causing harm. Through my analysis of the
deformed desires of the oppressors to follow, I will demonstrate how one may desire to increase
their relative privilege, and that to act on these desires contributes to the oppression of the
oppressed group. Under Cudd’s terms, the ‘merely privileged’ may hold these deformed desires
not with the intention to “continue or intensify the oppression of others”, but to increase their
own privilege, without perceiving the contingent relationship between privilege and oppression
(195). I am arguing that expanding the deformed desires model to include those who hold desires
which require them to gain from the oppression of another social group would qualify the holder
of those desires as not merely privileged, but as an oppressor.
Though one may not perceive the relationship of their desires to the oppression of the
oppressed group, I do not believe an oppressor must be aware of their oppressive behaviors to be
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an oppressor and contest Cudd on this point. By requiring that someone must be aware that they
are acting unjustly and harming someone thereby, we require that the oppressor sees themselves
as an oppressor, and under these requirements we may never identify an oppressor. Cudd herself
reminds us the most crucial aspect to consider when assessing group harm is the “effect on the
victim, not the intention of the perpetrator” (156). Proving intention of the perpetrator requires us
to subject our findings to the self-perception of the oppressor. Cudd warns that this is difficult,
first because the true intentions of an perpetrator are sometimes impossible to determine,
additionally because the perpetrator may not have been aware that their actions were oppressing
another group. Furthermore, I would argue that all oppressors believe themselves to be justified
in their actions. It is under the veil of an oppressive false consciousness that a privileged person’s
oppressive behaviors are seen as normal and warranted.
I argue that the deformed desires of the privileged should be included alongside Cudd’s
description of the deformed desires of the oppressed, because these desires are developed as a
mechanism of oppression, and operate to reinforce the narrative of inequality between different
social groups. Just the oppressed do not necessarily desire to occupy an oppressed state, but only
to occupy the social roles that tend to subordinate them, I am arguing that the privileged do not
necessarily desire to occupy an oppressive state, but only to occupy social roles or perform
certain behaviors which actively privilege them (180). I consider this to be a necessary expansion
on Cudd’s argument, because it demonstrates how one may deliberately act in ways that do
oppress others, but only with the interest in further privileging themselves. In this way, though
the individual may not be aware that they are acting in ways that do oppress others, they still
qualify as oppressors.
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Not only do these deformed desires of the privileged uphold systems of oppression, but I
am arguing that they are mutually inclusive with these systems. This is to say that the desires of
the privileged that I detail are not inherently desirable and would not exist in an egalitarian
world. One of the mechanisms of oppression is that it recognizes privileged groups as the
dominant culture. Therefore, the desires that these privileged groups hold are seen as natural
desires. Here I will detail some of the desires which I am arguing are commonly held among
privileged groups and are widely recognized as ‘natural’ desires but in fact are directly defined
by systems of oppression and would not otherwise exist. For example, it is common for white
people to recognize within themselves a desire to date exclusively within their own race. It is
commonly argued that this is simply a sexual or romantic ‘preference’ that is specific to the
individual. However, we can examine this from within the context of an oppressive and
racialized society in which dominant beauty standards are dictated by whiteness. Furthermore,
only dating white people preserves the white privilege of the individual and of their family
lineage, whereas dating outside of one’s race might result in an uncomfortable awareness of this
privilege, or even require that this privilege be acknowledged and denounced.
Regarding class privilege, consider how the accumulation of immense wealth is credited
to a Darwinian ‘drive’ among the richest of the rich, where wealth inequality is imagined to be a
natural result of the presence of this drive in some and the absence of it in others. The desire
among the privileged to obtain immense wealth is thereby seen as natural and universally
desirable, but I would argue that this is not the case. Were it not for the gross concentration of
material resources and capital among the wealthiest economic class, the luxury lifestyles that are
now seen as universally desirable would not be imaginable, let alone attainable for a small
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minority. The desire for excessive material wealth exists only within the context of oppressive
economic structures.
In the 20th century heterosexuality was modeled as the only natural biological human
sexuality from which homosexuality was a disordered deviation. Diverse physical and mental
abilities were pathologized as opposed to a dominantly defined physiological ‘normal’.
Concerning the desire among parents for ‘normal’ children, meaning those which are cisgender,
heterosexual, able-bodied and neurotypical, all of these desires are in the interest of avoiding
having child who lacks the same privileges they have and would not exist in a society which
does not oppress queer and differently abled persons.
Lastly, the dominant culture surrounding sexuality is largely tied to the oppression of
women, where only men were recognized as capable of enjoying sex because sex is was seen as
an act that exists for reproduction and the sexual fulfillment of men. Because sex is so directly
tied to oppression, it has been considered normal and natural for men to have irrepressible and
‘animalistic’ sex drives that do not require an active or willing sex partner to experience
pleasure. I am arguing that in an egalitarian world where there was no gender inequality and the
systematic subordination of females had never been enacted, it would not be desirable to engage
in sex acts with an unwilling partner. The desire for men to have sex with someone who does not
desire them is a product of the oppression women. All of these examples demonstrate how
desires held by those in privileged positions are defined by their privilege and though the
individuals may not be acting with the desire to further oppress others, their actions serve to
uphold and preserve their own privileged positions.
As Cudd defines them, oppressors are those who act intentionally to continue or intensify
the oppression of a social group to which they do not belong (195). This is to say that they must
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be aware that they are acting unjustly and thereby causing harm to a social group, though they
might not recognize this harm as oppression. As I describe them, the deformed desires would
demonstrate how ‘merely privileged’ are still actively participating and upholding oppressive
structures, though they may not realize the extent to which they are causing harm. By directly
examining the deformed desires of privileged groups, we can demonstrate the intimate
connections between these desires and the mechanisms of oppression which produced them.
Cudd’s definition of the ‘merely privileged’ suggests that to simply “gain materially or
psychologically” from one’s privilege does not qualify one as an oppressor (195). However, I am
arguing that it is necessary to expand Cudd’s definition of ‘oppressor’ to include those who
actively seek to increase their privilege relative to other groups, regardless of whether they
recognize the relationship between privilege and oppression or intend to cause harm to those who
are oppressed.
It is only through widespread fundamental conscious raising that members of both
privileged and oppressed groups may become aware that they are not inherently deserving of
their social positions. It is at this point that we can also begin to develop more far-reaching
resistance strategies. I agree with Cudd that the responsibilities of the oppressor should require
the cessation of all oppressive behaviors, which now include the desires to obtain or preserve
one’s own privilege. This is to say that oppressors must critically examine the desires they hold,
and evaluate where these desires come from to determine if they are their own or a product of a
system of oppression which favors the desire in question. The desires must be assessed by the
oppressor to see whether they can be attained without causing systematic harm to anyone else.
Once an oppressor has recognized their own deformed desires to increase or maintain their
privilege, and has ceased to act on those desires, they may be re-categorized as merely
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privileged. An objection could be raised here that asking oppressors to evaluate their own desires
is no more effective than asking oppressors whether they believe their actions to be oppressive or
not. However, what I believe to be especially effective about reframing one’s self-evaluation to
include an examination of one’s actions, as well as their desires, is that it reveals non-malicious
intents are often inadvertently oppressive. Reliance on individual self-reflection will always be a
necessary component of oppression resistance discourse, and may always prove to be a difficult
hurdle to overcome. The aim of this paper is to provide a more critical lens for members of
dominant social groups to apply to themselves while doing this personal work.

Conclusion
In this paper I argued for an expansion of Cudd’s consideration of who qualifies as an
oppressor, to include those who intend to increase or maintain their positions of relative
privilege. To explore this argument I provided some examples of deformed desires of the
privileged, including dating exclusively within one’s race as a romantic or sexual ‘preference’,
desiring substantial wealth, power, or prestige, wishing for cisgender heterosexual children with
‘normal’ physical and neurological abilities, or experiencing sexual desire and satisfaction
through sex acts within nonconsensual contexts. These desires are commonly occurring and
unnatural desires, products of widespread oppression and designed to maintain or increase the
privileged position of the carrier of these desires. Reserving the term oppressor for only those
who actively intend to harm others for their own benefit is too narrow a definition, and thereby
limits the scope of the resistance strategies we can hope to employ. By exploring these desires,
we are able open a more intimate investigation into the motives and experiences of the oppressor,
which better prepares us to design strategies to desist oppressing systems.
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